Nem tudo que brilha é ouro: continuidades na ordem internacional e limites à reconfiguração do sul global by Actis, Esteban & Zelicovich, Julieta
REVISTA - Bogotá (Colombia) Vol. 11 N.° 2 - Julio-diciembre 25
R
ec
ib
id
o:
 1
0 
de
 fe
br
er
o 
de
 2
01
6
Ev
al
ua
do
: 1
4 
de
 m
ar
zo
 d
e 
20
16
A
pr
ob
ad
o:
 1
7 
de
 m
ar
zo
 d
e 
20
16
Ar
tíc
ul
o 
de
 r
ef
le
xi
ón
Re
fe
re
nc
ia
: 
Re
fe
re
nc
ia
: 
Ac
tis
, 
E.
 &
 Z
el
ic
ov
ic
h,
 J
. 
(2
01
6)
. 
“A
ll 
th
at
 g
lit
te
r 
is 
no
t 
go
ld
”:
 C
on
tin
ui
tie
s 
in
 i
nt
er
na
tio
na
l 
or
de
r 
an
d 
lim
its
 t
o 
gl
ob
al
 s
ou
th
 
re
co
nf
ig
ur
at
io
n.
 R
ev
ist
a 
de
 R
el
ac
io
ne
s I
nt
er
na
ci
on
al
es
, E
st
ra
te
gi
a 
y 
Se
gu
rid
ad
. 
11
(2
), 
pp
. 2
5-
47
. D
O
I: 
ht
tp
://
dx
.d
oi
.o
rg
/1
0.
18
35
9/
rie
s.
18
69
rev.relac.int.estrateg.segur.11(2):25-47,2016
*   Research paper. This paper was written with funding from the 
National Council of Scientific and Technical Research (CONICET), 
Argentina at Rosario National University. The work is co-authored 
and the order in which the authors are mentioned is strictly 
alphabetical
**   PhD in International Relations.  National Council of Scientific 
and Technical Research (CONICET) - Faculty of Political Sciences 
and International Relations, Rosario National University (UNR), 
Argentina. E-mail: e.actis@conicet.gov.ar  
***   PhD in International Relations.  National Council of Scientific 
and Technical Research (CONICET) - Faculty of Political Sciences 
and International Relations, Rosario National University (UNR), 
Argentina. E-mail:  julieta.zelicovich@fcpolit.unr.edu.ar  
“NOT ALL THAT GLITTERS IS GOLD”: CONTINUITIES IN 
INTERNATIONAL ORDER AND LIMITS TO THE RECONFIGURATION  OF 
THE GLOBAL SOUTH*
Esteban Actis** 
Julieta Zelicovich***
ABSTRACT
Current literature on International Relations has 
noted, for quite some time, that international power 
is undergoing a transformative process and that we 
are facing a “reconfiguration of the global South.” 
However, our opinion is that these statements 
exaggerate the depth and nature of the transformations. 
In this paper we will put forth for discussion the widely 
used concepts of “reconfiguration of the international 
order” and “democratization of international 
relations” and seek to test their scope and limits. Our 
hypothesis is that, even though since the beginning 
of the twenty-first century a redistribution of mainly 
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economic resources has taken place globally, the rules, principles, institutions 
and policies that have structured the international system since the second half of 
the twentieth century have not changed. The discourse maintained by emerging 
powers is one of system reform, but in their actions they attempt to converge with 
traditional powers, following the path of liberal order. For the rest of the “South” 
this situation does not raise new possibilities for influencing and participating in 
the international system, but replicates the asymmetries and dependencies of the 
prevailing order. 
Keywords: BRICS; International Economic Order; International Relations; South-
South Relations 
NO TODO LO QUE BRILLA ES ORO: CONTINUIDADES EN EL ORDEN 
INTERNACIONAL Y LÍMITES A LA RECONFIGURACIÓN DEL SUR GLOBAL
Resumen
La literatura predominante en las relaciones internacionales señala, desde 
hace algunos años, que el poder internacional se encuentra en un proceso de 
transformaciones y que se está en presencia de una “reconfiguración del sur 
global”. En nuestra opinión, sin embargo, estas afirmaciones sobredimensionan 
la profundidad y el carácter de las transformaciones. En este trabajo pondremos 
en debate los conceptos tan extensamente utilizados de “reconfiguración del 
orden internacional” y de “democratización de las relaciones internacionales” 
y buscaremos testear sus alcances y límites. Nuestra hipótesis es que si bien 
desde comienzos del siglo XXI se ha producido una redistribución de los recursos 
principalmente económicos a nivel global, las reglas, principios, instituciones y 
normas que han venido estructurando el sistema internacional desde la segunda 
mitad del siglo XX no han presentado cambios. Las potencias emergentes 
enuncian un discurso de reforma del sistema, pero en sus acciones intentan 
converger con los poderes tradicionales, transitando por el sendero del orden 
liberal. Para el resto del “sur” este accionar no genera nuevas posibilidades 
de participación e influencia en el sistema internacional sino que replica las 
asimetrías y dependencias del orden prevaleciente. 
Palabras clave: BRICS, orden económico internacional; relaciones 
internacionales, relaciones sur-sur.
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NEM TUDO QUE BRILHA É OURO: CONTINUIDADES NA ORDEM 
INTERNACIONAL E LIMITES À RECONFIGURAÇÃO DO SUL GLOBAL
Resumo
A literatura que prevalece nas relações internacionais aponta, nos últimos 
anos, que o poder internacional está em um processo de transformação e 
que estaríamos na presença de uma “reconfiguração do sul global”. Em nossa 
opinião, no entanto, estas alegações exageram a profundidade e o caráter das 
transformações. Este artigo irá discutir os conceitos tão amplamente utilizados 
de “restruturação da ordem internacional” e “democratização das relações 
internacionais” e procurará testar o seu alcance e limites. Nossa hipótese é que, 
embora desde o início do século XXI houve uma redistribuição de recursos 
principalmente econômicos a nível global, as regras, princípios, instituições 
e normas que têm vindo a construir o sistema internacional desde a segunda 
metade do século XX não tinha alterações apresentadas. As potências emergentes 
estabeleceram um discurso de reforma, mas em suas ações tentam convergir 
com os poderes tradicionais, em todo o caminho da ordem liberal. Para o resto 
do “sul” esta ação não gera novas oportunidades para a participação e influência 
no sistema internacional, mas replica as assimetrias e dependências da ordem 
vigente.
Palavras-chave: BRICS; Ordem Econômica Internacional; Relações 
Internacionais; Relações Sul-Sul
Introduction 
The rise of BRICS sparked off 
considerable debate in the discipline 
of International Relations. The 
impressive growth of these economies 
in a decade of high international 
permissiveness led to the suggestion 
of a profound transformation in the 
international order and the so-called 
“reconfiguration of the global South4.” 
Now that more than a decade of the 
twenty-first century has gone by, we 
can legitimately wonder if, analyzing 
the behavior of this group of states, it 
is possible to maintain the hypotheses 
regarding a new international order. At 
any rate, it would be useful to specify 
the scope of those transformations in 
the system and the effect they have 
4   In several articles and academic conferences in the IR disciplinary field a recurring use of the term can 
be observed. As an example we can mention the Conference of the International Studies Association 
-ISA- (Buenos Aires, 2014) and the special call of the Barcelona Centre for Internationals Affairs-CIDOB- 
(Barcelona, 2016). With respect to publications, the works of Pelfini and Fulquet (2015); Stuenkel, (2015); 
Quiliconi and Kingah (2016) can be named as examples.
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had in the emerging countries’ foreign 
policies, both with respect to their links 
to the central powers and prevailing 
institutions as well as to the group 
of developing countries. ¿Has there 
been a reconfiguration of international 
order? ¿Has the rise of BRICS led to 
transformations of the power structures 
and their institutions? ¿Are we facing 
a more democratic order? ¿Did more 
possibilities open up for the rest of the 
global South?
From these initial questions, in this 
paper we will seek to prove three 
arguments. Firstly, that even though 
since the beginning of the twenty-
first century a redistribution of 
mainly economic resources has taken 
place globally, the rules, principles, 
institutions and policies that have been 
structuring the international system 
since the second half of the twentieth 
century have not shown any substantial 
changes. As a consequence, our 
second argument is that the discourse 
maintained by emerging powers is one 
of system reform, but in their foreign 
policies they attempt to converge with 
traditional powers, following the path 
of liberal order. As a third point, we 
maintain that for the rest of the “South” 
the behavior of the emerging powers 
does not bring about a significant 
transformation in their possibilities 
for influencing and participating in 
the international system, but rather 
replicates the asymmetries and 
dependencies of the prevailing order.
That being said, the paper is structured 
in the following order. The first section 
is called “Prevalence of liberal order 
and limits to global redemocratization/
multilateralization.” In it we carry 
out a conceptual review of current 
prevailing literature, focusing on 
the debate between realism and 
liberalism with respect to the rise of 
emerging powers and their impact 
on the configuration of international 
order. To consider which has been the 
impact of the mentioned phenomena 
on the reconfiguration of international 
order, we will turn to a set of empirical 
references, instances in which the 
BRICS countries have behaved in ways 
that do not stray from the patterns 
of current liberal order. Namely, the 
creation of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB) promoted by 
China; as well as the behavior of that 
country in the OMC negotiations; the 
stance of the mentioned countries 
on the reforms of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World 
Bank (WB), and the encouragement of 
Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) by 
Brazil. The second section introduces 
the debate on “The other South: links 
between developing countries and 
emerging powers.” There we will 
discuss some of the consequences 
implied by recognizing the limits 
to world order transformations. To 
do so, we will analyze the complex 
relationship between Brazil and 
Argentina, since they represent a link 
between an emerging country and 
a developing country, both in the 
commercial and financial dimensions 
of their link. Finally, the conclusions 
of the paper are presented as well as 
their impact on IR research. It is crucial 
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to specify the concepts regarding the 
transformations that took place and to 
gather further empirical evidence in 
order to clarify certain clichés typical of 
our disciplinary field. The perspective 
from which prevailing literature has 
studied the phenomenon that this 
paper analyzes has been eminently 
optimistic, and that is not consistent 
with our findings so far.  
Development of the Topic
Prevalence of Liberal Order and 
Limits to Global Redemocratization/
Multilateralization
 
The concept of International Order is a 
key element in the debate that frames 
this paper. However, it has not always 
been explicitly defined. From realism 
and neorealism the emphasis on the 
concept of international order has been 
placed on the distribution of power, 
within only one structure (Waltz, 
1988). The behavior of states will 
depend on the distribution of relative 
capabilities within the international 
structure. Greater concentration of 
power in a few players will lead to 
vertical orders, while a dissemination 
of power into many agents will bring 
balanced power structures as a result.  
For their part, neoliberals, presuming 
the fungibility of power, have 
considered the existence of multiple 
structures and identified order 
with the possibility of generating 
cooperation instances through 
principles, institutions, standards of 
behavior and rules, which guide the 
conduct of states. The discussion about 
international regimes has overlapped 
with that of international order. Unlike 
realists, they are not unaware of the 
significance of power relations in 
the determination of order, but they 
maintain that international regimes 
can intervene between the states’ links 
when power relations vary (Keohane, 
1988).
Finally, critical theories (Cox, 1983; 
Wallerstein, 1979) have focused their 
analysis on the inequalities intrinsic 
to capitalist economic structure 
and the restrictions these imply 
for the development of peripheral 
countries. This situation has caused 
the crystallization of power relations 
in the international system and, 
therefore, it brought about as a result 
the conformation of an order whose 
main characteristic is the North-South 
division.    
Despite theoretical differences, a 
general consensus has existed in the 
literature about the effects the rise of 
emerging countries (mainly, BRICS) 
has had in the current international 
order. Authors belonging to realism 
and liberalism as well as supporters 
of critical approaches agree on the 
assumption that the end of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century 
reveals that the power distribution in 
the international system (at an interstate 
level) has undergone significant 
changes (Zakaria, 2011; Nye, 2011; 
Keohane, 2009). As Ikenberry points 
out, “here is no longer any question: 
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wealth and power are moving from the 
North and the West to the East and the 
South” (2011:17). 
However, differences emerge 
regarding the nature of the observed 
transformations and their impact on 
the international order. The more 
optimistic ones have been arguing the 
advent of a “democratization,” as a 
result of the dispersion of power and 
the rupture of the North-South division 
fruit of the multipolarization of power 
resources. This is the line of thinking 
in which we find the contributions 
of Latin American left-wing authors 
(Bernal Meza, 2013; Ferrer, 2012, 
Bresser Pereyra, 2010). Other more 
moderate interpretations note rifts 
but also continuities in the current 
international order, such as Fareed 
Zakaria in his famous thesis about the 
rise of the rest and Jospeh Nye’s theory 
about smart power. The latter supports 
the idea of multipolarism provided 
that the board on which the tokens 
of international politics move are 
identified: while on the military board 
we can observe no great changes, on 
the economic board we can detect 
a growing multipolarity. Hass also 
recognizes the fragmentation of the 
international order, expressed in the 
concept of nonpolarity (Hass, 2008). 
For their part, scholars like Buzan and 
Lawson (2014) suggest the emergence 
of a “decentralized globalism” that 
maintains its liberal character. In this, 
no state may replace the USA as a 
superpower, inasmuch as no state will 
be able to acquire sufficient relative 
power to dominate the system on 
the whole. In this regard, Ikenberry 
(2011) can also be considered to 
have extensive literature on the limits 
emerging powers encounter so as to 
modify the liberal international order. 
Lastly, there are authors who place no 
faith in the idea of multipolarity, given 
the fragility of power of the emerging 
countries, thus questioning the very 
explicative weight of the multipolarity 
concept (Brun, 2015). The depth of the 
power distribution, how sustainable it 
may turn out to be, and how receptive 
may be the governance of twentieth-
century international order are the 
diverging lines between the different 
stances.  
Having said that, within the debate 
on the multiple interpretations of the 
notion of “multipolarity” of the current 
order, in this specific section we wish 
to focus on two main points. First of all, 
we wish to note that there is significant 
evidence to support the idea that the 
relative distribution of economic power 
has changed in comparison with the 
last decades of the twentieth century 
(Laffaye, S., Lavopa, F., y Pérez Llana, 
C., 2013). This change has focused 
on the highest segment, considering 
the distribution of global GDP. In 
other words, well into the second 
decade of the twenty-first century, 
the concentration of economic power 
in the North countries in relation to 
BRICS, in categories such as resources, 
capital and investments, trade, stock of 
technology, market access, etc., is less 
than it was at the beginning of 2000. 
However, the distribution of those 
elements among developed countries 
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plus BRICS, and the rest of the world, 
still shows high asymmetry levels. For 
instance, if we take participation in 
world trade during the first decade of 
the twenty-first century, no structural 
changes can be observed in commercial 
concentration, although it is possible 
to see some changes regarding the 
main participants, with China5 gaining 
prominence in particular (Zelicovich, 
2013).
The second aspect has to do with 
the behavior of emerging powers in 
relation to the current liberal world 
order. This order is the expression 
of Western development in the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries 
and is sustained by principles such 
as endorsement of democracy as a 
form of government and free market 
as an economic model, as well as the 
existence of a de facto hierarchy of 
states, which are sovereign and self-
determined (Ikenberry, 2011). The 
great question lies in knowing whether 
BRICS, after a decade of noticeable 
rise in international hierarchy, are 
willing to change the game rules and 
build a new “non-liberal” international 
order (more rebellious and revisionist, 
fragmented into blocs, protectionist 
and with regional rivalries) or, on the 
contrary, their strategy is to accept and 
walk along the liberal international 
order designed by the powerful “club” 
(mainly, the USA). In other words, the 
question that arises in an international 
rise context is the following: Which 
strategy is more convenient to 
keep “climbing” the ladder of the 
international system? The dichotomy 
lies in joining the club and playing by 
the established rules or questioning the 
club and some of its rules and trying to 
replace them.
Realist interpretations (Brzezinski & 
Mearsheimer, 2006; Kaplan, 2010) 
note that the relative increase of 
power in a group of states inexorably 
leads to global tensions, disputes and 
conflicts, given the limitations of the 
current order to respond to the needs 
for international rise. Thus, from the 
point of view of these interpretations, 
rebellious and revisionist strategies 
are essential (and unavoidable) if the 
goal is to avoid the freezing of force 
relationships in the international 
system.
Against the statements of the realist 
approach, so far the elements of liberal 
order (based on rights, institutions, 
asymmetric distribution of power, 
principles) have not been affected by 
the economic rise of BRICS, nor have 
its actions been questioned. The five 
BRICS countries have global ambitions 
and have maintained the need to 
reform the current global governance 
5   According to statistical data from the WTO, five countries encompass half of the world trade (excluding 
European Union internal trade). Only in 2008, 2010 and 2011 it’s necessary to add a sixth country to 
account for 50% of global trade. In those cases Korea (in 2008) and Russia (in 2010 and 2011) are the ones 
who join the list.
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system (Smith, 2015). However, this 
demand for a greater share of power in 
international organizations has not led 
to an alteration of those organizations’ 
structural foundations. One of the 
reasons for this continuity lies in the 
nature of such rise. In specific terms, 
in world economy, global production 
chains and transnational finances are 
linked to a series of players and interests 
within the borders of the “rising” states, 
which generates incentives to maintain 
the current structure that allowed such 
rise. We agree with liberal approaches 
(Ikenberry,2011; Buzan, 2010; Hurrell, 
2006) on the fact that for emerging 
powers the incentives to operate 
within the liberal international order 
are much greater, given that, once 
certain attributes of power are gained, 
it is more convenient to usufruct the 
rules, practices, and institutions than 
attempting to transform the system. 
As Buzan and Lawson (2014) suggest, 
the universe of differences (specially 
ideological) that may arise between 
the different developed and rising 
countries is narrow, and the common 
standards shared by elites regarding 
what they expect from globalization 
reduce conflicts. More optimistic 
interpretations find that this limited 
capacity to change the system is due 
to the youth of the group and to an 
alignment of interests in the prevailing 
institutions, considered as forums to 
build alliances against more powerful 
states and to propose their interests 
(Smith, 2015). Either way, it is accurate 
to state that “despite having recognized 
the growing abilities of the [BRICS] 
bloc, we find no evidence that they 
combine them with anti-establishment 
aspirations” (Turzi, 2011:109).
For example, so far in this decade, China 
(and other emerging powers) have not 
contested the underlying principles of 
the current (liberal capitalist) order. 
In Hongsong Liu (2014) we may 
find empirical evidence on China’s 
participation in recent negotiation 
processes: both in WTO’s Doha Round 
as well as in G20’s debates, China has 
not questioned the current principles 
and rules of the system, but rather 
the way in which power is distributed 
in international organizations, 
demanding their reform What China 
has encouraged with its proactive 
involvement in said contexts is more 
of an expansion of pro-development 
principles, without contesting the 
system components. Thus, China and 
other emerging countries have sought, 
through multilateral institutions, greater 
room to demand rights and revise 
some rules, but not the elimination of 
existing bodies. “Although the United 
States’ position in the global system 
is changing, the liberal international 
order is alive and well” (Ikenberry 
2011).
In this way, the prevalence of liberal 
order does not mean there have 
not been any changes. There is a 
new relative distribution of power, 
although it has not affected the core 
of behavior rules, principles, and 
institutions of the prevailing order. 
Multilateralization seems to be limited, 
and instead of a redemocratization we 
observe a reordering in the hierarchy 
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of the relative power structure. The 
reconfiguration of international order 
turns out to be limited, and rather more 
a mere rhetorical exercise that certain 
political leaders use to legitimate not 
so democratic actions of their states.
At this point, we deem relevant to delve 
into the used concepts: does the fact 
that there are more centers of power 
imply a redemocratization? When the 
concept of democracy as a national 
political regime is extrapolated to the 
international arena, certain distinctive 
features of said concept should 
be considered, such as the equal 
opportunity to participate held by 
every member of the system, similar to 
the possibility citizens have for voting 
under equal conditions; the prevalence 
of guidelines or norms that justify and 
organize the existence of a power 
structure, similar to a constitutional 
charter, and the upholding of certain 
liberties. However, as we shall see, 
those aspects are not evident in the 
current state of affairs, nor do they 
seem likely if we look at BRICS’ 
behavior. In fact, historically speaking, 
there is no empirical evidence of a 
truly democratic international order. 
After more than half a century of power 
concentrated in a few hands (the bipolar 
order of the Cold War and the unipolar 
one of the immediate post-Cold War 
era), the international order once 
again began to show signs of a growing 
multipolarity (several centers of power) 
at the beginning of the new century. 
However, a greater dissemination of 
power –understood as attribute and 
as influence– into multiple players has 
clashed with an international order 
designed and structured in a world that 
no longer exists today. In other words, 
according to the discourse of the main 
leaders of emerging powers, the new 
configuration of the world map must 
be accompanied by significant reforms 
of the institutions and norms of global 
governance that reflect the changes 
that have taken place. Thus, the 
notions of “democratizing international 
relations” or “democratizing 
globalization” became part of those 
players’ diplomatic lexis in the different 
international forums. They claim that 
the stage is now set so that many players 
can have a full say in international 
affairs and the same attributions are 
not limited to a handful of countries. 
Nevertheless, and spite of the discourse 
they maintain, the actions that many of 
those countries have been taking are 
not compatible with the idea of global 
democracy. In fact, emerging powers 
try to legitimate a reordering of the 
hierarchy of the world power structure 
–the goal to which they really aspire. 
We agree with Smith (2015:26), who 
points out that this (BRICS) group 
does not seek to undermine the 
global multilateral system, but does 
seek to gain greater representation in 
existing institutions. Though, as the 
author notes, problems arise when 
there are attempts to put these broad 
compromises into practice. 
As Ikenberry states (2014), countries 
like China and Russia, are not 
revisionist powers, but rather part-time 
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“spoilers.” In the empirical evidence 
reviewed below, we shall see that 
BRICS countries not only have not been 
revisionists, but have also contributed to 
strengthening and spreading the liberal 
order. In that course, they have been 
inclined to sustaining a hierarchical 
structure, and in the best-case scenario 
the “democratizations,” if there were 
any, only reached themselves and not 
other developing countries. Within the 
Bretton Woods order institutions, the 
behavior of BRICS countries shows 
no structural transformations. As for 
WTO negotiations, we have already 
pointed out China’s role as one of the 
emerging states with greatest market 
power, but which has not translated 
such power into reforming the system, 
only limiting itself to promoting certain 
principles. Meanwhile, Brazil and India 
have encouraged reforms in matters 
of Intellectual Property and Public 
Health, as well as Agriculture, but have 
not shown any kind of support towards 
the rest of the developing countries 
when it comes to perpetuating the 
negotiations’ method of gatherings 
in smaller groups, like in the so-
called Green-Room6. That is to say, 
negotiations are still carried out among 
a few countries. At the same time, in 
the WTO’s Dispute Settlement Body, 
we observe a strong participation of 
BRICS in arguments, since they turn 
to this mechanism as a way of facing 
developed countries (Delich, 2015). 
Both behaviors end up strengthening 
and legitimizing the pre-existing liberal 
order in trade matters. 
Within the IMF, in the context of the 
debates which took place in the G20 in 
the months following the 2008 crises, 
BRICS countries focused their actions 
on strengthening the institution, in 
exchange for increased power quotas 
(Haibin, 2012). According to the 
reform that began in 2008, and was 
then expanded in 20107, there is “a 
shift of more than 6 percent of quota 
shares to dynamic emerging market 
and developing countries and more 
than 6 percent from over-represented 
to under-represented countries, while 
protecting the quota shares and voting 
power of the poorest members” (IMF, 
2010). As a result, “the 10 largest 
members of the Fund will consist of the 
United States, Japan, the ‘BRIC’ (Brazil, 
China, India, the Russian Federation), 
and the four largest European countries 
6   It’s a negotiation method which seeks to reach agreements among a small number of negotiating parties, 
then expanding them to the rest of the members. During the GATT negotiations, Green Room-style 
meetings were common. Those were summoned by the General Director, and in their innermost circle 
they included the most important countries, such as the USA, the European Union (then EEC), Canada, 
Japan, as well as other key players depending on the topic of negotiation. During the Doha Round, this 
practice took on the system of mini-ministerial negotiations and meetings of 5, 6 or 7 countries. The 
exclusiveness and the transparency issues of these gatherings have been criticized by those who were 
excluded from them.  
7 However, this last reform needs to be ratified by the USA to take effect. 
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(France, Germany, Italy, the United 
Kingdom)” (IMF, 2010). Around the 
same time, the World Bank increased 
its capital and voting power: there was 
“a 3.13 percentage point increase in 
the voting power of Developing and 
Transition countries (DTCs) at IBRD, 
bringing them to 47.19 percent, a total 
shift to DTCs of 4.59 percentage points 
since 2008” (WB, 2010). Precisely 
China, India, and Brazil were among 
the countries that benefited the most 
from this reform. Developing countries 
that experienced a slight boost of their 
power quickly lost it under the effects 
of the subsequent recession over the 
next years. As the studies of Vestergaard 
and Wade (2014) reveal, only four 
years after the changes of 2010, the 
voting power of developing countries 
had reduced by 3%. In this sense, 
the reform of international economic 
governance has been rather limited 
in the number of countries which 
benefited from it and moderated with 
regard to the level of transformation 
achieved. 
More recently, China has promoted 
the creation of the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank. In its official website, 
it is described as a “a multilateral 
development bank (MDB) conceived 
for the twenty-first century,” in a 
clear allusion to showing itself as an 
innovation within a new international 
order, far from financial institutions “of 
the twentieth century” such as the WB 
and the IMF. The AIIB arose in 2013 as 
an initiative of the People’s Republic 
of China after President Xi Jinping’s 
visit to Southeast Asian countries. After 
nearly two years of negotiations, on 
June 29th  2015, 50 countries signed 
the Articles of Agreement, becoming 
Founding Members. A salient fact is 
that among them are countries from 
all regions in the world, many of them 
traditional allies of the USA8.
The new bank reflects a new geopolitical 
reality framed by the rise of China as 
a world power (Renard, 2015). Since 
the beginning of the second decade 
of the twenty-first century, China 
seems determined to play its role 
of international creditor (the Asian 
giant has over 3,000 billion dollars in 
international reserves) with the goal of 
gaining political and financial influence 
in the international system. The AIIB, 
together with the New Development 
Bank (BRICS bank), are the two 
institutions promoted under Beijing’s 
leadership whose main aim lies in 
offering public assets, thus establishing 
themselves, along with Washington, as 
“hegemonic stabilizers,” according to 
8   The following are founding members: Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Brunei 
Darussalam, Cambodia, China, Egypt, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Israel, Italy, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Republic of Korea, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Luxembourg, Maldives, 
Malta, Mongolia, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Portugal, Qatar, 
Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, the United Arab 
Emirates, the United Kingdom, Uzbekistan, and Vietnam.
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the famous notion coined by Charles 
Kindleberger.
As Elgin-Cossart & Hart (2015) very 
well argue, Chinese leaders are 
throwing capital into these new 
lending institutions because they are 
frustrated with Washington’s refusal to 
support reforms in the World Bank and 
the IMF, that would give China and 
other emerging nations more power, 
on par with their growing relative clout 
worldwide. In this sense, a general 
consensus seems to exist over the AIIB 
representing a clear example of the 
new power distribution in the twenty-
first century, which appears to be 
shifting from the West to the East. 
Nonetheless, the functioning of that 
institution resembles that of the “old” 
organizations. The AIIB’s operations 
are very similar to the way in which 
the USA has ensured control over the 
Bretton Woods institutions created 
under its influence zone. China 
managed to get 26% of the Board of 
Governors’ votes, since it is by the far 
the biggest contributor (30.34% of the 
total funds). As a consequence, Beijing 
has veto power over key decisions 
of the Bank because these require at 
least 75% of the votes. For this reason, 
despite China’s claim of helping to build 
“a more equitable, just and effective 
architecture of global governance,”9 the 
newly created AIIB is far from meeting 
these ideal principles. The new bank 
is an obvious example that the dispute 
over international order is quantitative 
(material distribution of power) and 
not qualitative (norms, rules, and 
functioning of governance) in nature.      
Another case in which we can observe 
the tendency to maintain the liberal 
order, even in the midst of the BRICS’s 
rise, is in the shift of Brazilian foreign 
policy towards the signing of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties (BITs). Brazil’s 
stance on that sort of agreements has 
changed over the last twenty years, 
passing through different standpoints 
which can be described conceptually 
as shifting from rejection to acceptance 
(Actis, 2015). Brazil’s changing stance 
regarding these bilateral treaties 
needs to be understood in the light 
of the economic transformations 
undergone by the country. In the 
1990s, the South American country 
was, almost exclusively, a mere 
recipient of Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) flows coming from developed 
economies. The context of economic 
liberalization did not manage to 
break the defensive attitudes towards 
international economy that was still 
perceived by Brazilian elites as a threat 
to the interests of the production 
sector. As a result, the 14 BITs signed 
–and proposed by developed nations– 
9   Statements of China’s President Xi Jinping in an interview carried out by the “The Wall Sreet 
Journal.” Available in http://www.wsj.com/articles/full-transcript-interview-with-chinese-president-xi-
jinping-1442894700.
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between 1995 and 1999 were not 
ratified by Congress, because they 
were deemed to damage national 
sovereignty, given the prerogatives and 
benefits they offered to the interests of 
foreign multinational companies. 
The situation described above began 
to change by the middle of the first 
decade of the twenty-first century. By 
that time, Brazil was not only a major 
recipient of FDI but had also become a 
country that issued investment capital 
flows as a result of the consolidation 
of many of its large companies 
(Odebrecht, Camargo Correa, JBS, 
Votorantim, Magnesita, Gerdau, 
Marfrig, Marcopolo, BrazilFood, Weg, 
Embraer, Vale, Petrobras, Banco do 
Brasil, Vale, among others) as genuine 
multinationals. Such players started 
to demand offensive policies, since 
globalization offered not only threats 
but also “opportunities.” Besides, 
under the administrations of “Lula” Da 
Silva (2003-2010) a series of events 
took place –tensions with Petrobras 
in Bolivia and Odebrecht in Ecuador– 
which affected Brazilian investments 
in foreign countries, increasing 
companies’ pressure to obtain some 
protection for their businesses. 
However, within the framework of a 
foreign policy with a strong political 
content, the administration of the 
former union leader did not add the 
topic to its agenda due to BITs’ North-
South connotations.
At the beginning of her term, Rousseff 
tried out a less “politicized” foreign 
policy with a lower profile. In that 
context, some proactive progress was 
made regarding the promotion and 
protection of Brazilian investments 
with an agreement that attempts to 
distance itself from certain “one-
sided clauses” contained in traditional 
BITs. The Acordo de Cooperação e 
Facilitação de Investimentos (ACFI)10 
or Agreement on Cooperation and 
Facilitation of Investments (in English), 
which could be called “light BIT,” fulfils 
its role of providing legal certainty to 
Brazilian investments while trying not 
to damage the sovereign competences 
of the host states. In short, ACFIs 
represent a significant adjustment in 
Brazil’s foreign policy as a result of 
the changing domestic needs related 
to the new interests of Brazilian 
big companies and business sector. 
The current paradox is that some 
of the norms and tools of the liberal 
10   Brazil’s Foreign Affairs Minister, Ambassador Mauro Viera, signed  in April 2015 two ACFIs with Angola 
and Mozambique. After two years of drafting and negotiating, Brazilian diplomacy managed to sign 
international agreements with African countries. ACFIs, which need to be ratified by Congress, are part 
–beyond their characteristics and their name– of the universe of what is known as Bilateral Investment 
Treaties (BITs), which attempt to be a political and legal tool to promote and protect investments. By 
the end of 2015, this sort of agreements have already been signed with Mozambique, Angola, Mexico, 
Malawi, Chile, and Colombia, while negotiations are still being conducted with South Africa, Algeria, 
Morocco, Peru, and Tunisia.
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international order (such as BITs) that 
were once criticized and rejected –
even by the currently ruling party– have 
now become resources for Brazil’s 
rise in international structure and for 
Brazilian –globalized– development.
The other South: Links between 
Developing Countries and Emerging 
Powers
If we accept that democratization is 
only limited, we can hardly speak of 
a “reconfiguration of the South,” or at 
least of a positive and homogenous 
reconfiguration of the South. The 
re-ordering of BRICS in the global 
hierarchy, as the main examples of 
emerging powers, represents for 
developing countries –those that make 
up the “other South”– an increasing 
complexity in their foreign relations. 
Asymmetric and dependant relations 
in the twenty-first century are not 
limited to North-South relations: 
the connections between emerging 
powers and developing countries 
within South-South relations also 
reproduce the asymmetries. As a 
consequence, the “South” category 
no longer explains one set of relations 
among states, but rather three types: 
one among developing countries, 
another between them and emerging 
powers, and a third type that binds 
emerging states together. 
While for the first of these types the 
prevailing IR literature is still valid, and 
for the third one we find extensive 
work referring to BRICS, their scopes, 
and limits (Da Silva, 2014; Oropeza 
García, 2011; Shaw, 2015, among 
others), the relation between emerging 
powers and developing countries has 
been less studied. One of the cases 
we can mention is Muhr (2014), and 
Schoeman (2011) as well. In order 
to contribute to the development of 
such line of research, we conclude 
this paper with the analysis of two 
recent cases of a relation between 
an emerging power (Brazil) and a 
developing country (Argentina). In fact, 
both in their commercial and financial 
relations we can observe some of the 
characteristics and dilemmas posed by 
this sort of link.
  
The tensions of negotiating next to a 
global player: Argentina and Brazil in 
the Doha Round. 
The Doha Round negotiations were 
one of the topics that Argentina and 
Brazil shared in their agenda of foreign 
economic relations in the twenty-
first century, under the protection 
of MERCOSUR. However, the 
growing asymmetry between the two 
countries ended up undermining and 
complicating their potential mutual 
cooperation, revealing the complex 
nature of a bond between an emerging 
power and a developing country.
By 2008, in the context of the beginning 
of the international financial crisis, 
the negotiations had reached a point 
in which an agreement was sorely in 
need, and a mini-ministerial meeting 
was summoned in Geneva with the 
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purpose of discussing a possible 
package of measures to be agreed 
upon. Although there had already been 
several disagreements between Brazil 
and Argentina within the Doha Round, 
examples of “cooperation through 
leadership11,” it was in this week in 
2008 when it the impact of shifting from 
a status of two developing countries to 
one of a developing country and an 
emerging power was felt with greater 
force. The fact that Brazil sought 
to play a more political role within 
the multilateral structure caused the 
MERCOSUR partners to act differently.  
For the mid-2008 mini-ministerial 
meeting, MERCOSUR had prepared 
its joint negotiating position during 
the San Miguel de Tucumán summit 
(July 2008). In this gathering the 
bloc countries had agreed on “the 
need for new progress to be made 
in the issues of Agriculture and 
Non-agricultural Market Access 
(NAMA) which would allow us to 
reach balanced and forward-looking 
agreements that meet the necessity 
of promoting trade liberalization and 
favoring development, particularly of 
developing countries.” To do so, they 
urged developed countries to achieve 
results “that address the less than full 
reciprocity and show a special and 
more favorable treatment towards 
developing countries.” 
However, on the fifth day of the 
negotiations in Geneva there was a 
change in modality and out of 25 
states summoned, only 7 of them 
gathered round a “small table” (G7) 
on July 21st: Australia, Brazil, China, 
the United States, India, Japan, and 
the European Union. In that new 
scenario, neither MERCOSUR nor 
G20 managed to maintain their joint 
negotiating positions. Faced with the 
new negotiating situation, the Brazilian 
representatives separated themselves 
from the bloc’s position and prepared 
to accept “as a whole” the proposals 
made by WTO General Director, Pascal 
Lamy12, which were not supported by 
the rest of the developing countries.
This situation triggered a series 
of diplomatic tensions. Neither 
Argentina, nor the other MERCOSUR 
members or the G20, felt represented 
by Brazil’s actions (Corradini, 
2008). As for Brazil, its replies were 
categorical: Celso Amorim said that 
Brazil could not be “held hostage” by 
Argentina, and added that “I knew 
there were differences, but I thought 
that what was good for Brazil would 
also be good for Argentina” (Corradini, 
11   It is a “kind of asymmetrical cooperation in which the leader country proposes to the ones led what it 
would be in their best interest to do (Jaguaribe, 2004)” (Miranda, 2004).
12 On that subject, Stancanelli (2008) noted that the coefficient of 8 for industrialized countries would 
make it possible for the USA and the European Union (EU) to decrease their tariffs by 42%. However, for 
Argentina, a coefficient of 20 (the lowest coefficient for developing countries) would imply an average 
reduction of 60% of its current consolidated industrial tariffs.
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2008). For its part, Argentina pointed 
out that Brazil was the one who had 
departed from the joint negotiating 
position. In their statements to the 
press, Argentinian officials noted 
that “our country worked with more 
rigidity or with less flexibility because 
we demanded a strict compliance with 
the Doha Round criteria: not having 
to pay excessively in industrial market 
opening what we would be getting in 
matters of agricultural liberalization, 
and that developing countries would 
have to make [import] tariff reductions 
that were smaller than those of 
developed countries –all of which was 
not fulfilled” (Rebossio, 2008).
In the crisis context, progress in 
negotiations stalled over disagreements 
concerning agriculture and the gap 
in the stances held by India and the 
USA13, and not over the negotiations 
on non-agricultural market access 
and Argentina, or this country’s 
disagreements with Brazil and 
the Lamy Package. However, for 
MERCOSUR, and specially for the 
Argentina-Brazil relationship, the 
negotiation in Geneva was one of 
the events that showed the weakness 
of the regional bloc institutions and 
the limitations of joint bargaining 
in contexts in which the interests of 
“development” clashed with those of 
the “global player.” Not only was there 
no progress made on what had been 
defined as an agreed position, but this 
situation also highlighted how, in the 
face of a growing asymmetry and a 
lack of strong institutions, the problems 
of the distribution of negotiations’ 
impacts grow deeper as “lesser” states 
are forced to subsume their own 
national interests to those of the leader. 
Besides, the succeeding disagreements 
undermined the external perception 
of the bloc, as well as the cohesiveness 
of the trade coalition of the G2014. 
Argentina-Brazil in the face of 
new asymmetry forms: functional 
asymmetry in the FDI global system. 
Around the second half of the twentieth 
century, developing countries in 
general, and Latin American ones in 
particular, began integrating themselves 
to the economic competitiveness 
of multinational companies from 
developed countries in search of new 
markets and resources. For South 
American economies with big markets 
and industrial productive structures, 
both in the period of the imports 
substitution model as well as –and 
specially– in the boom of economic 
13   Detailed information on the SSM debates and a comparison between the different projects discussed are 
available in World Trade Organization (2008).
14 Previously, in 2005, there had been some similar minor disagreements, when Brazil made an offer in the 
NAMA which was larger than the one agreed within MERCOSUR. The conflict was brief, give that in that 
instance Argentina did quickly accept Brazil’s offer, since the reduction would not affect national sensitive 
products.
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liberalization, the attraction of FDI 
inflows played a key role in the opinion 
of policy-makers. In this context, 
Argentina and Brazil became major 
recipient players –or host countries– 
for FDI inflows in the 1990s. 
The status as FDI host countries 
created common perceptions in the 
governing elites of both countries 
regarding the benefits15 of attracting 
and receiving foreign investments. The 
transfer of technology and technical 
knowledge, job creation, access to 
financing sources, encouragement 
of competition with local producers, 
and income of foreign currency and 
their positive impact on the balance of 
payments were all aspects praised by 
the administrations of Mello-Franco-
Cardoso in Brazil and the Carlos 
Menem’s administrations in Argentina.
In the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, Brazil and Argentina began a 
process of incipient internationalization 
of their productive structures (CEPAL, 
2005). Both economies established 
abroad (mainly in the region) a small 
number of successful companies from 
the substitution model. In this way, 
Brazil and Argentina shared until 
the end of the twentieth century a 
functional symmetry in the FDI global 
system by being major developing 
countries which hosted significant 
FDI inflows and had incipient 
internationalization processes of their 
national economic groups.
The situation described underwent 
significant changes at the turn of the 
twenty-first century. By the beginning 
of the 2010s, we can see a shift 
from a situation of symmetry to one 
characterized by a fork in the path of 
Brazil and Argentina with respect to 
the FDI global system. While Brazil 
became a major player regarding 
inward and outward FDIs as a result 
of the consolidation of its companies’ 
internationalization process, Argentina 
continued to be, basically, a host 
country due to its exclusion from the 
third wave of internationalization and 
the multilatinas process (Santiso, 2008). 
We conceptualize this phenomenon as 
a functional asymmetry in the FDI global 
system between Brazil and Argentina. 
Its nature lies in the fact that, while 
Argentinian economy –and its production 
framework– was not able to break 
denationalization and foreignization 
with the “post-convertibility”16 model 
(Aspiazu, D., Manazanelli, P. y Schorr, 
M., 2011), which only intensified its 
15   The negative impacts of FDI inflows were not a main concern for the government. However, they caused 
considerable debates among both societies. As Stiglitz (2002) points out, the displacement of local 
competitors, the monopolistic status of the companies, and their lack of compliance with local laws, 
among others, are some of the issues that FDI host countries have to face.
16 The notion of “post-convertibility” refers to the workings of Argentina’s economy after the end of a fixed 
exchange rate and monetary policy (called convertibility) which lasted during all of the 1990s until the 
devaluation in January 2002.    
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peripheral status, at the same time 
Brazilian economy –as well as a great part 
of its productive structure– did become 
internationalized and established itself 
at the core of global capitalism. In the 
twenty-first century both processes not 
only took place simultaneously, they also 
reinforced each other, causing the shift 
from a situation of symmetry to one of 
asymmetry17. 
An example of how this asymmetry 
affected the relations between the 
countries took place in 2012. Years 
before, in 2009, Brazilian company Vale 
had began to make great investments 
in the province of Mendoza, which 
included potassium mining and the 
construction of a railroad to transport 
this product through the Bahía Blanca 
harbor, also expanded by Vale. In 2012, 
as commodities’ prices decreased and 
Argentine economy underwent some 
changes, the company decided to 
abandon the project. This situation 
caused disharmony in the bilateral 
relation: while Argentina demanded 
the Brazilian government to intervene 
in the situation, so as to protect the 
investment and the jobs, Brazil’s 
reaction was the one historically shown 
by developed FDI-issuing countries. 
Brazil favored the company’s private 
interests, not submitting its decision 
to bilateral diplomatic affairs. Vale 
withdrew its investment and created 
a negative socioeconomic impact for 
the host country. The fact that the 
Brazilian government –like any other 
country with FDI outflows– saw its 
bilateral relations affected as a result 
of controversies with its national 
companies and that, at the same time, 
the Argentinian government –as a host 
country– had specific disagreements 
with major multinational companies 
–Brazilian, in this case– was one of 
the most striking novelties in the 
development of the bilateral link in 
the course of the twenty-first century, 
which is an incident true to the nature 
of the functional asymmetry in the FDI 
global system. So, it becomes clear how 
by having large companies investing 
abroad, Brazil begins to experience 
dilemmas typical of developed 
countries with FDI outflows, and this 
situation affects its bilateral relations, 
causing difficulties in cooperation 
forums within the “other South.”
Conclusion
Traditionally, analyses of International 
Relations in the twentieth century 
17   Bouzas and Kosacoff (2010) conducted a study and analysis of the increased economic asymmetries 
in favor of Brazil. The authors point out that along with the structural asymmetry (size) that exists since 
2000other three asymmetries have consolidated: market share, productive and regulatory specialization. 
It should be noted that these asymmetries, like the one studied in this paper, should be seen in the light of 
Brazil’s greater relative growth (in terms of net GDP) with respect to Argentina. According to World Bank 
data, while Brazil’s GDP was (in average) twice that of Argentina during the 1990s, by the second decade 
of the twenty-first century, Brazilian economy was four times larger than Argentinian economy.
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distinguished two types of main links: 
the first between developed countries 
among themselves, and the second 
between developed countries and 
developing countries. To a lesser extent, 
the study of a third (and marginal) type 
of link could be identified, concerning 
the relations among developing 
countries. The reconfiguration of 
international order, understood as a 
reordering in the hierarchy of nations, 
as a result of the rise of a certain group 
of countries, forces us to use new 
conceptual categories by adding two 
key relations to the previous ones: 
one between developed countries 
and emerging countries, and another 
between emerging countries and 
developing countries.
With respect to the first of these new 
links, the evidence analyzed in this 
paper is not conclusive to state that 
BRICS are playing a transforming role 
in the international system, rather that 
the scope of the reforms they have 
encouraged is quite limited. The (re)
democratization of the international 
system has not been that deep and, 
in essence, the structural aspects 
of the liberal order are still intact. 
Simultaneously to the decrease of 
the relative asymmetry in power 
resources (mainly economic), we 
observe a growing convergence of 
interests between developed countries 
and BRICS, which has facilitated 
cooperative relations channeled 
through existing institutions. Although 
tensions still exist, the BRICS’ ways 
of facing them replicate those of the 
liberal order. Even in a case such as the 
creation of the AIIB, which could be 
considered as a certain challenge to 
the current order and power struggle, 
its functioning replicates the same 
practices of power accumulation 
typical of the questioned “old order.” 
In contrast to this, in the relation 
between emerging countries and 
developing countries, interests begin 
to diverge in the context of an increase 
of certain power asymmetries. The 
heterogeneous nature typical of the so-
called “South” has exacerbated in the 
course of the twenty-first century. For 
developing countries, the rise of BRICS 
has not resulted in a democratization 
of the international order, while their 
foreign relations and cooperation 
forums have become more complex. 
Not only in the North-South axis, but 
also within the South itself, BRICS 
have replicated the same sort of 
behavior once displayed by developed 
countries.
In the IR discipline there is a pressing 
need to incorporate these nuances 
into the analyses and to dislodge 
certain increasingly-used clichés about 
the configuration of the South and 
its role in the current international 
order. The nature of mainstream IR 
has caused biased researches, with 
plentiful theorizing and empirical 
analyses focused on the links between 
developed countries in which the South 
is presumed to be a homogenous group 
that can be driven by BRICS. There are 
not many analyses that acknowledge 
the asymmetries and power logics 
that constrain relationships within 
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the so-called “South”, and these are 
necessary to account for the order 
reconfiguration processes. Otherwise, 
we will continue carrying out analyses 
guided by the logic of desires (wishful 
thinking) and not by the logic of facts.   
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